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Abstract
Generically the probabilities of observational results depend upon both
the quantum state and the rules for extracting the probabilities from it. It
is often argued that inflation may make our observations independent of the
quantum state. In a framework in which one considers the state and the
rules as logically separate, it is shown how it is possible that the probabilities
are indeed independent of the state, but the rules for achieving this seem
somewhat implausible.
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Introduction
A goal of science is to produce complete theories Ti that each predict normalized
probabilities Pj(i) of observations Oj,
Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj|Ti) with
∑
j
Pj(i) = 1. (1)
Assuming that a complete physical theory of the universe is quantum, I would
argue [1] that it should contain at least the following elements:
(1) Kinematic variables (wavefunction arguments)
(2) Dynamical laws (‘Theory of Everything’ or TOE)
(3) Boundary conditions (specific quantum state)
(4) Specification of what has probabilities
(5) Probability rules (analogue of Born’s rule)
(6) Specification of what the probabilities mean
Here I shall call elements (1)-(3) the quantum state (or the “state”), since they
give the quantum state of the universe that obeys the dynamical laws and is written
in terms of the kinematic variables, and I shall call elements (4)-(6) the probability
rules (or the “rules”), since they specify what it is that has probabilities (here
taken to be the results of observations, Oj, or “observations” for short), the rules
for extracting these observational probabilities from the quantum state, and the
meaning of the probabilities. What I shall write below is largely independent of the
meaning of the probabilities, though personally I view them in a rather Everettian
way as objective measures for the set of observations with positive probabilities.
Usually it is implicitly believed that the observational probabilities depend strongly
upon the quantum state. (Sometimes the Everett interpretation [2] is taken to mean
that all of physical reality is determined purely by the quantum state, without the
need for any additional rules to extract probabilities, but this extreme view seems
untenable [4] and will not be adopted here. Instead, I shall discuss the opposite
view, that the probabilities are independent of the quantum state.) However, some
advocates of inflation[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]
often claim that our observations do not depend upon the quantum state at all, but
rather that inflation acts as an attractor to give the same statistical distribution of
observations from any state.
In this note, I shall use the framework of state plus rules to discuss this possibility
that observational probabilities might be independent of the quantum state. I shall
show that this indeed is logically possible, but apparently only if the probability
rules are rather ad hoc. If indeed the rules are this ad hoc, so that the probabilities
of our observations do not depend upon a quantum state at all, it would seem to
leave it mysterious why many of our observations can be simply interpreted as if our
universe really were quantum.
2
1 States and rules
Let me first discuss the logical independence of the quantum state and the prob-
ability rules. I shall assume that even if one fixes the kinematic variables and the
dynamical laws, there remains freedom in what the quantum state is (e.g., many
different solutions to the same Schro¨dinger equation with the same arguments and
the same Hamiltonian, or many different solutions to the constraint equations of
quantum gravity). The set of all quantum states obeying whatever kinematic and
dynamical constraints one might impose I shall call the state space; it might or
might not be a Hilbert space. The states themselves might be pure states, density
matrices, or C*-algebra states, but I shall assume that they are at least C*-algebra
states, so that each state gives the expectation value of the kinematically allowed
quantum operators. For simplicity, I shall often assume that the quantum state is
a pure state in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, though most of the discussion
should be generalizable to any C*-algebra states.
In traditional quantum theory, observational results are eigenvalues of a certain
self-adjoint operator called an observable, which in the finite-dimensional case at
least can be written as a sum of orthonormal projection operators (formed from the
eigenstates of the observable, or from the eigenspaces of eigenstates for degenerate
eigenvalues) multiplied by coefficients that are the eigenvalues of the observable.
Then the observational probability of each eigenvalue is given by Born’s rule [23] as
the expectation value of the corresponding projection operator in the quantum state
of the system. In this case, the logical freedom of the probability rules is the freedom
to choose the observable whose eigenvalues represent the observational results.
In the case of a pure state in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, the state by
itself does not determine the observational probabilities, since the probabilities also
depend upon the orthonormal projection operators corresponding to the observable.
Furthermore, any other pure state in the same Hilbert space would give the same
probabilities for another observable obtained simply by transforming the original
observable by the same unitary transformation used to transform the state from the
original one to the final one. (This unitary transformation is not uniquely defined,
since only its action on the original quantum state is specified, so there is a large
set of different transformed observables that all give the same probabilities as well.)
Then the probability of an eigenvalue of the new observable in the new state would
be the same as that of the eigenstate of the originaly observable in the original
state. Thus states by themselves do not determine probabilities, and all pure states
give the same probabilities when they are paired with corresponding observables.
It is only the relation between the state and the observable that determines unique
probabilities by Born’s rule.
In cosmology with a universe large enough that there may be copies of an ob-
server, no matter how precisely it is described locally, Born’s rule does not work
[24, 25, 26, 1] and must be replaced by another set of rules for extracting obser-
vational probabilities from the quantum state. Generically then the ambiguity in
the rules is even greater than in traditional quantum theory in which one needed to
specify just one quantum operator, a single observable, in addition to the state.
3
Here for simplicity I shall focus on cases in which the set of rules are that obser-
vational probabilities are obtained by normalizing a set of unnormalized measures
that are each given by the expectation value of a positive operator in the quantum
state,
Pj(i) =
pj(i)∑
k pk
with pj(i) = 〈qj〉i, (2)
where qj is the positive operator corresponding to the observational result Oj (or
observation j, for short), and where 〈. . .〉i denotes the quantum expectation value,
of whatever operator replaces the . . . inside the angular brackets, in the quantum
state i given by the theory Ti. Then, instead of the single observable required to
give the probability rule in traditional quantum theory by Born’s rule, one needs a
whole set of positive operators qj , one for each observation j.
Quantum theories of this form may be axiomatized by the following two axioms:
State: There is a quantum state that gives expectation values of operators.
Rules: Each possible observation has a corresponding positive operator whose
expectation value in the quantum state is the measure for that observation.
When we want to do a Bayesian analysis and compare different theories Ti for
which we have assigned prior probabilities P (Ti), we would like to normalize the
measures for observations by dividing by the total measure and then interpret the
normalized measures as the likelihoods or the probabilities of the observation given
the theory, P (Oj|Ti). Then if we had a complete set of theories for which we assigned
nonzero prior probabilities, so
∑
i P (Ti) = 1, then the posterior probability of theory
Ti, given the observation Oj, would be given by Bayes’ formula as
P (Ti|Oj) =
P (Ti)P (Oj|Ti)∑
l P (Tl)P (Oj|Tl)
. (3)
Under the assumption that observations are conscious perceptions, the operators
qj whose expectation values would then give the measures of the corresponding
conscious perceptions were called awareness operators in my previous work [27, 28,
29, 30], but in [24, 25, 26, 1] and here I am not restricting to the assumption that
observations must be conscious perceptions (though I have not given up my personal
belief that the most fundamental observations are indeed conscious perceptions).
The only restriction on observations I am making here is that each of them should
be a complete observation in the sense that no observation is a proper subset of
another observation. Here, let us call the qj observation operators, since it is their
expectation values that give the ratios of observational probabilities.
2 Rules giving state-independent probabilities
Now let us consider whether we can have probability rules giving observational
probabilities independent of the quantum state, as is often claimed or wished to be
the case for inflationary universes. It is clear that if 〈qj〉i is to be independent of
the quantum state, the observation operator qj must be proportional to the identity
4
operator, qj = pj(i)I, with each nonnegative pj(i) that can be chosen arbitrarily and
independently of the quantum state. Then indeed the observational probabilities are
independent of the quantum state. Therefore, there is no logical difficulty in defining
probability rules such that the probabilities of observations are independent of the
quantum state, as is often claimed or wished to be for inflation.
On the other hand, it seems quite ad hoc to have the observation operators all be
proportional to the identity, so that the observational probabilities are independent
of the quantum state. If that were the case, what would be the point of having a
quantum state at all in the theory? One could just say that the theory consisted
of directly giving the observational probabilities Pj(i) (perhaps from unnormalized
probabilities pj(i) if they are instrinsically simpler). If our observations are indeed
independent of the quantum state, why have our observations been taken to support
quantum theory? That is, why has it been so successful to unify and simplify the
description of our observations by assuming that they arose from quantum aspects of
the universe, if they come from the expectation values of operators that all commute?
Therefore, although I have shown here that it is logically possible for our ob-
servations (meaning their probabilities) to have arisen from probability rules that
make them independent of the quantum state, the way to do this seems highly ad
hoc and implausible. Surely a much simpler explanation of our observations will use
both a non-random quantum state and a non-random set of rules for extracting the
probabilities of observations from that quantum state.
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